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Malone: Admissibility of Recovered Memories

JUST HOW RELIABLE IS THE HUMAN MEMORY? THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF RECOVERED REPRESSED MEMORIES IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Shannon Lynn Malone*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether the human mind is capable of locking away traumatic
events as a coping mechanism to merely unravel the trauma in the
years that follow is a phenomenon recognized as “repressed memories” 1 or “dissociative amnesia.” 2 The mystery of this phenomenon
has long intrigued the psychiatric community and the debate has continued further to the judicial system. The extension of crucial statutes
of limitations in cases involving allegations of criminal child sexual
abuse, by several jurisdictions, may further the admission of testimony
relating to recovered memories and dissociative amnesia in child sexual abuse cases. 3 Notwithstanding the safeguards proclaimed to ensure that expert witness testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant,
otherwise reliable, relevant, and admissible testimony may still be suppressed on the ground that its potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. 4
* Second year law student at Touro Law Center, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, class of
December 2020, Stony Brook University B.A. (2016). I would like to thank the Hon. Mark
D. Cohen, Supervising Judge of County Court, Court of Claims Judge and Acting Supreme
Court Justice, New York Supreme Court 10th Judicial District, and Samuel J. Levine, Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute at Touro Law Center, Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center for their steady support and guidance; furthermore, I am grateful for their thoughtful comments throughout this project.
1 Com. v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 759, 919 N.E.2d 1254, 1262 (2010).
2 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 478 (4th ed. 1994).
3 See 33A CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 186:12. (2019).
4 State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 68-69, 733 S.E.2d 535, 540 (2012) (citing Rule 403, Excluding
Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons and the court
in State v. Coffey, 345 N.C. 389, 404, 480 S.E.2d 664, 673 (1997) holding that: “the trial court
still must determine whether [the expert testimony’s] probative value outweighs the danger of
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Repressed memories of sexual abuse have been admitted into
evidence supplemented by expert witness testimony in several civil trials throughout the country. Notably, in a 1995 federal case, Isely v.
Capuchin Province, 5 the district court allowed the plaintiff’s treating
therapist to testify as an expert witness concerning repressed memories
which were unearthed through extensive therapy. 6 Though courts have
been reluctant to admit such testimony in criminal proceedings, the
court in Isley announced guidelines by which repressed memories may
be admitted in a criminal trial. 7 Thereafter, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California found expert witness testimony regarding recovered repressed memories properly admissible
within the context of a first-degree murder trial later that year. 8 Thus,
the court in Franklin v. Duncan 9 held: 10
. . .[R]eliance by a jury on “recovered memory” testimony does not, in and of itself, violate the Constitution.
Then as now, such testimony is admitted into evidence
unfair prejudice to defendant”); See also State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 26, 366 S.E.2d 459,
463 (1988) (holding that otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded “if its probative
value is outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the issues before the court or mislead
the jury”); State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 41, 347 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1986) (citing the holding in
State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 731, 340 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1986) in which the court held the
determination as to whether to allow or exclude evidence pursuant to Rule 403 is a determination left within “the sound discretion of the trial court.”). Id.
5 Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1066-67 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
6 In Isely v. Capuchin Province, the court allowed the plaintiff’s treating therapist to testify;
however, it limited the scope of the testimony to the expert’s opinion; Shahzade v. Gregory,
923 F. Supp. 286, 44 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 646 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Isley in holding that a
witness may testify to an alleged sexual assault occurring fifty years prior); Doe v. Roe, 191
Ariz. 313 (1998) (upholding the admissibility of recovered repressed memories into evidence
in a civil trial and allowed a tolling of the statute of limitations for tort claims: “Under the
discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or with reasonable
diligence should know the facts underlying the cause. The rationale offered for the discovery
rule is that it is unjust to deprive a plaintiff of a cause of action before the plaintiff has a
reasonable basis for believing that a claim exists.”). Id. See also § 56:31. Jurisdictions admitting testimony based on repressed-then-restored memory, 7 Jones on Evidence § 56:31.
7 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1259.
8 Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (N.D. Cal.), aff’d, 70 F.3d 75 (9th Cir. 1995).
9 Id.
10 In Franklin v. Duncan, the appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after being
convicted of first-degree murder in relation to the murder of his daughter’s childhood friend
nearly twenty-years following the slaying. Id. The conviction in this case was based largely
on the defendant’s daughter recovering the repressed memory of witnessing her father murder
her childhood friend. Id. Though the court upheld the admissibility of such testimony, it
granted the appellant’s writ of habeas corpus, holding that the prosecuting attorney violated
the appellant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights on grounds unrelated to the analysis of dissociative amnesia. Id.
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and is then tested as to credibility by the time-honored
procedures of the adversary system. Admissibility of
the memory is but the first step; it does not establish
that the memory is worthy of belief. In this regard mental health experts will undoubtedly, as they must, continue their debate on whether or not the “recovered
memory” phenomenon exists, but they can never establish whether or not the asserted memory is true. That
must be a function of the trial process. 11
The analytical process promulgated in Franklin was definitively applied by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2010,
in Commonwealth v. Shanley, 12 where the court held expert witness
testimony supporting the validity of dissociative amnesia admissible
under the two-prong Frye 13 and Lanigan 14 standard due to the nature
of the debate among the relevant scientific community. 15 The court in
Shanley upheld the lower court’s finding that expert witness testimony
on recovered repressed memories and dissociative amnesia was sufficiently reliable to support its admission in a criminal sexual abuse case
brought nearly twenty years following the cause of action. 16 The court

11 Id. (holding further: “[b]y definition, trials are based on memories of the past. The
recognition that memory grows dim with the passage of time is part and parcel of the trial
system. Jurors are instructed that in assessing credibility they are to consider the ability of the
witness to remember the event with the implicit assumption that asserted memories of events
long past must be subject to rigorous scrutiny. From the common sense perspective of the trial
process, then, a memory which does not even exist for a long passage of time and then is
“recovered” must be at least subject to that same rigorous scrutiny. This case, then, may be
described as a “recovered memory” case, but in reality it is a “memory” case like all others.
After direct and cross examination, after consideration of extrinsic evidence that tends to corroborate or to contradict the memory, the focus must be on the credibility, the believability,
the truth of the asserted memory. More specifically, from the perspective of this reviewing
Court, the focus must be on the test of the credibility of the asserted memory which was conducted in the trial itself. Was it fair? Was it, or was it not, tainted by impermissible violation
of Constitutional principles?”). Id.
12 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1260.
13 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14 Com. v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (1994).
15 In Com. v. Lanigan, the court urged the significance of the standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993),
where the Supreme Court held the standard for determining the validity of scientific testimony
to be based on numerous factors, most notably, the changing opinions in the scientific community. Id.
16 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1259.
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justified its ruling based on the testimony’s general acceptance in the
scientific community and supporting case studies. 17
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized
a means to introduce evidence arising from the recovery of a repressed
memory without the introduction of expert witness testimony.18 In
State v. King, 19 the court discussed the conflicting opinions between
two professors of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, both qualified
as experts in the subject of psychiatry, specializing in repressed memories. 20 As the court noted, “they disagree about almost everything.”21
Although the court upheld the trial court’s suppression of expert testimony relating to dissociative amnesia or repressed memories, it established a method to introduce testimony concerning recovered repressed
memories without the requisite expert witness testimony. 22 Thus, the
court in King held that lay witness testimony relating to alleged recovered memories could be properly admitted into evidence as long as it
does not violate any other statute or applicable rule of evidence. 23 This
decision demonstrates the difficulties in evaluating the legitimacy of
recovered repressed memories due to contradictory opinions among
leading experts specializing in the phenomenon and the consequent
uncertainty. 24 Furthermore, this evidentiary loophole creates a problematic standard by which future courts may circumvent the necessity
of expert witness testimony. 25

17

Id.
King, at 733 S.E.2d at 536.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 The defendant offered the testimony of Harrison G. Pope, Jr., M.D. and the state offered
the testimony of Dr. Chu; both experts discussed the nature and reliability of repressed memories while ultimately disagreeing as to whether these memories are sufficiently reliable as to
be admissible in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 537.
22 King, 733 S.E.2d, at 535-36 (holding “. . .[a]lthough we affirm the holding of the Court
of Appeals majority that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion, we disavow the
portion of the opinion that, relying on an earlier opinion of that court, requires expert testimony
always to accompany the testimony of a lay witness in cases involving allegedly recovered
memories.”). Id.
23 Id. at 542.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 541 (“. . . holding, we stress that we are reviewing the evidence presented and the
order entered in this case only. We promulgate here no general rule regarding the admissibility
or reliability of repressed memory evidence under either Rule 403 or Rule 702. As the trial
judge himself noted, scientific progress is “rapid and fluid.” Advances in the area of repressed
memory are possible, if not likely. . .”). Id.
18
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Following this preliminary discussion of the relevant evidentiary standards, the third section of this Note will analyze the inherent
fallibility of human memory, as it affects the reliability of courtroom
testimony. The focus will be on determining whether an individual,
most frequently a child, may repress traumatic events from his or her
awareness and continue to discuss the possible manifestation of false
memories and how an individual can wholeheartedly believe a deceptive memory of a traumatic experience. The discussion will then consider whether such memories should be admissible, as supported by
expert witness testimony, in criminal proceedings. The fourth section
of this Note will examine the notion of implanted memories and the
questionable therapeutic methods implemented to solicit the phenomenon. Finally, this Note will conclude with an argument urging a careful and critical approach when considering the weight and sufficiency
of relevant factors in determining the credibility of scientific evidence
as promulgated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 26
II.

COMMON LAW & STATUTORY BACKGROUND REGARDING
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

In order to assess the admission of expert witness testimony
supporting the validity of recovered memories and dissociative amnesia, it is important to understand the procedural history regarding the
introduction of scientific evidence.
A.

Frye: The Strict “General Acceptance Rule”

Half a century prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, a strict standard for the admission of expert testimony accompanying scientific evidence was precedent. 27 In Frye v. United
States, 28 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
26 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d
469 (1993), the Court promulgated the numerous factors courts should consider when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. These standards include: (1) whether the expert’s theory and methodology can be or have been tested; (2) whether the expert’s theory and
methodology have been subjected to peer-reviewed or publication; (3) the known or potential
error rates for a particular technique; (4) any standards and controls applicable to the science;
and (5) the degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific or expert community. Id.
27 The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect on July 1, 1973. FED. R. EVID. Refs & Annos.
Fifty years earlier, in 1923, the standard in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
was promulgated.
28 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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lower court’s decision to deny the appellant’s offering of expert witness testimony concerning the outcome of a lie-detector test performed
on the appellant. 29 The court announced what is currently referred to
as the strict “general acceptance” rule when determining the credibility
and resulting admissibility of expert witness testimony relating to the
introduction of scientific or otherwise technical or complex forms of
evidence. 30 Currently, the narrow standard is still applied in nine jurisdictions across the United States. 31 This evidentiary standard may
be found in an often-cited passage that previously served as precedent:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages
is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs. 32
Under Frye, expert witness testimony based on one or more
scientific theories or methodologies is admissible only if it is generally
accepted as credible in the applicable scientific community. 33 This
community encompasses individuals with the “special experience or
knowledge” necessary for the formation of a meaningful opinion on
the “science, art, or trade.” 34 The general acceptance standard promulgated in Frye embeds a strict burden on the proponent of new or controversial scientific methodologies in the context of expert witness

Id. at 1013.
“Under the Frye ‘general acceptance’ test, scientific evidence is admissible at trial only
if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion is based is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs; “general
acceptance” does not mean universal acceptance and it does not require that the methodology
in question be accepted by unanimity, consensus, or even a majority of experts, but rather
means that the underlying method used to generate an expert’s opinion is reasonably relied
upon by experts in the relevant field.” See N. Tr. Co. v. Burandt & Armbrust, LLP, 403 Ill.
App. 3d 260, 933 N.E.2d 432 (2010).
31 1 Expert Witness Checklists § 1:301 (3d ed.)
32 Frye 293 F. at 1014.
33 Id. at 1013.
34 Id.
29
30
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testimony. 35 Accordingly, under Frye, the admissibility of scientific
testimony is based solely on the predominant opinion within the relevant specified scientific community, allowing for a uniform standard
in permitting scientific-based expert testimony. 36 Consequently, under
Frye, the standard of review in permitting such testimony is strict.37
Nevertheless, such an unequivocal standard allows for certain application and predictable results. Therefore, the rule promulgated in Frye
entrusts the relevant scientific community with the task of ruling on
the merits of novel concepts, research, and diagnoses, further safeguarding the trustworthiness of such evidence when admitted by
means of expert witness testimony.
Although once the prominent authority in the admission of expert witness testimony, currently, fewer than ten states apply the Frye
standard when determining whether or not it should allow an expert
witness to testify. 38 This is because of the evolving nature of scientifictestimony and the need to evaluate the merits of each novel scientific
methodology or theory, individually, within the context of the specific
case at bar. Though most jurisdictions have broadened their standards
regarding expert witness testimony by employing a rule that mirrors
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 39 precisely nine states still apply some
version of the standard established in Frye. These jurisdictions include:
(1) Florida, where Frye is only applicable when an expert’s testimony is related to a breaking or novel scientific theory or method. 40
35 The rule promulgated in Daubert henceforth made general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community, merely, one of many factors in determining the admissibility of novel
scientific or otherwise technical testimony. See Dwight A. Kern & Robert J. Kenney, Jr., Frye
Meets Parker and the Effect on Toxic Exposure Cases, N.Y. ST. B.J., March/April 2007, at 2627. The more flexible Daubert test demoted the Frye “general acceptance” standard to just
one of several admissibility components for expert testimony. Id.
36 1 Expert Witness Checklists § 1:301 (3d ed.)
37 Kern, supra note 35.
38 Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w017-6355. See also notes 36-44.
39 Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w017-6355.
40 See DeLisle v. Crane Co., 2018 WL 5075302, at *8 (Fla. Oct. 15, 2018) (holding Florida
statute § 90.72 unconstitutional when authorities attempted to replace the rule established in
Frye with the more flexible Daubert standard; see also Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164,
1166-67 (Fla. 1995) (detailing Florida’s reasoning for upholding Frye). Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w-017-6355.
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(2) Illinois, where Frye is applied in a uniform manner
when determining the admissibility of expert witness
testimony. 41
(3) Iowa, which enforces its own codified rule in regard
to expert witnesses, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence
702 which governs expert testimony and requires:
(a) all evidence to be relevant to the case at issue,
(b) the expert’s knowledge to be based on scientific,
specialized, or technique knowledge, for the purpose of
assisting the trier of fact, and
(c) the expert must possess the required skills,
knowledge, training, experience, or education to effectively assist the trier of fact; however, when testimony
relates to any novel or complex scientific theories or
methodologies, the state of Iowa requires the testimony
to meet the stricter burden promulgated in Frye. 42
(4) Maryland established a similar rule to Frye, the
Frye-Reed standard, which allows expert testimony
only when the expert is offered with the purpose of
bridging “the analytical gap between accepted science
and the expert’s ultimate conclusions.” 43
(5) Minnesota explicitly rejected the standard established in Daubert, by conversely applying a variation
of Frye, the Frye-Mack standard requiring all novel scientific evidence to be found generally acceptable within
the scientific community before allowing such testimony. 44
(6) New Jersey applies a broad and malleable standard,
which mirrors the Federal Rules and Daubert, in all

41 ILL. R. EVID. 702; see also In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 529-30 (2004);
see also Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist
w-017-6355.
42 IOWA R. EVID. 702; Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 628 (Iowa 2000); Leaf v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Iowa 1999).
43 Savage v. State, 166 A.3d 183, 195-96 (Md. 2017); MD. RULE 5-702; see also Blackwell
v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 241-43, 250-56 (Md. 2009).
44 Goeb v. Tharaldson, 614 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000); MINN. R. EVID. 702; see also
Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 156 (Minn. 2012).
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civil cases, and by contrast, applies the rigid Frye standard in all criminal proceedings. 45
(7) New York remains a leader in the application of the
Frye “general acceptance” rule, in which the court’s focus is on whether the novel methodologies, hypotheses,
or theories are sufficiently accepted within the scientific community to be admissible in court. 46
(8) In Pennsylvania, courts employ a Frye analysis
whenever expert testimony is held to be novel or controversial, or when there is a genuine question as to
whether the expert is applying the methodology, at issue, in a conventional manner. 47
(9) Converse to the Iowa rule, Utah enacted Utah Rule
of Evidence 702, which, unlike Iowa Rule of Evidence
702, does not mirror or adopt Federal Rule of Evidence
702, and does not require expert testimony to be reliable, based on sufficient quantifiable facts, research, or
data, nor to have been applied to the specific facts of
the case at issue; instead, Utah’s standard in permitting
exert testimony embodies a Frye-like analysis by holding general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community to be synonymous with the satisfaction of
the three preceding considerations and their application
to the specific facts of the case at issue. 48

45 State v. Cassidy, 2018 WL 6002926, *6 (N.J. Nov. 13, 2018) (Although standards for
expert testimony in civil cases are broadened under a Daubert analysis, the court held Frye to
remain the standard for admissibility in all criminal proceedings); In re Accutane Litig., 234
N.J. 340, 397-98 (2018) (applying the factors enumerated in Daubert for civil proceedings but
reiterating the court’s reluctance to broaden the standard to the context of criminal cases); N.J.
R. EVID. 702.
46 Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 762, 762 (2014) (holding “the particular procedure need not be unanimously indorsed by scientists rather than generally acceptable
as reliable”).
47 Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 53, 58 (Pa. 2012); PA. R.E. 702; see also Grady
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1044 (Pa. 2003) (When Frye is inapplicable, a proponent is
only required to demonstrate that the witness has “a reasonable pretension to specialized
knowledge of the subject at issue.”) Id. at 52.
48 UTAH R. EVID. 702 and Advisory Committee Notes; see also Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson
v. Davis Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766 (Utah 2010). See generally for a continuously
updated state-by-state overview of the standards governing the admissibility of expert witness
testimony at trial, and more specifically, whether a jurisdiction applies the Frye standard, Federal standard, Daubert standard, or its own unique ruling in allowing expert witness testimony,
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The Federal Rules of Evidence 702: Easing the
Burden that is “General Acceptance”

The strict standard established in Frye governed the admission
of scientific, or otherwise specialized, expert witness testimony for
fifty years following its promulgation, until the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. 49 Specifically, Federal Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, superseded the previously applied Frye
standard, replacing its authority within federal court. 50 The unyielding
and unequivocal “general acceptance” approach was replaced by a
broadened, malleable standard, allowing for the introduction of novel
or contested scientific methodologies and opinions. 51 The federal rule
outlines the necessary elements to be satisfied in order for an expert
witness to testify in federal court. Federal Rule 702 reads as follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case. 52
In general, the purpose of the rule “. . . is simply to ensure that
a fact-finder is presented with reliable and relevant evidence, not flawless evidence.” 53 Accordingly, Rule 702(d) must be analyzed with
see Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w017-6355.
49 Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w017-6355.
50 Id.
51 Id. See also Joseph A. Spadaro, An Elusive Search for the Truth: The Admissibility of
Repressed and Recovered Memories in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 30 CONN. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (1998) (discussing Daubert’s replacement of the Frye
standard in federal court, “[t]he opinion in Daubert was unanimous. The Frye test, as a standard for resolving federal admissibility questions, was held to be inappropriate. Because Frye’s
general acceptance test could not be found in either the language or the legislative history of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Court held that this test does not survive Rule 702’s enactment.”).
52 FED. R. EVID. 702 (2019).
53 State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 945 A.2d 1, 10 (2008).
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some degree of flexibility. This is necessary to encompass the multitude of circumstances and situations that may reasonably and foreseeably be presented, and to preserve the distinct relationship between the
jury as the fact-finder and the judge as the “gatekeeper.” The judge
holds the crucial obligation of safeguarding the validity and relevance
of evidence offered to the jury. 54 Inevitably, as scientific research
evolved, the standards for its admission in court broadened, creating a
shade of gray in an area that was once unambiguous and indisputable.
This was first illustrated by the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence
702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, and further outlined by the
United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 55
Daubert crafted numerous factors to aid the trial court in determining
the validity of scientific testimony and established criteria by which
the trial court may fulfill its role as a “gatekeeper” in the admission of
expert testimony based on a novel scientific methodology or theory. 56
C.

Daubert: Constructing Factors to Determine the
Legitimacy of Expert Witness Testimony Based
upon Controversial or Novel Scientific Evidence

While the legal system ordinarily does not assess the pace of
evolving scientific standards in substance or practice, the holdings in
Daubert make the admission of novel or controversial scientific theories more probable. 57 The factors promulgated in the Daubert decision
reflect a deliberate response to rapidly expanding scientific methods;
however, the broadened parameters of the standard allow for a wide
array of judicial discretion. 58 The Supreme Court rejected the concept
of a strict test for courts to apply in determining the admissibility of
proffered expert witness testimony, under Federal Rule of Evidence
54

Id.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2019); C.f., supra note 26, citing the Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
56 Daubert, 509 U.S at 597 (holding that “general acceptance” is no longer a precondition
to admission of scientific based expert testimony at trial and recognizing “. . . in practice, a
gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the
jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance
that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”) Id.
57 Joseph A. Spadaro, An Elusive Search for the Truth: The Admissibility of Repressed and
Recovered Memories in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 30 CONN. L.
REV. 1147, 1153 (1998).
58 Id.
55
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702, and instead established a flexible standard completely converse
to the prior Frye “general acceptance” rule. 59 The factors promulgated
by the Supreme Court in Daubert include: (1) whether the expert has
a theory and methodology that has the ability to be tested, and if it has
in fact been tested; (2) whether the expert has a theory and methodology that has been the subject of research, peer-review, case study, and
publication; (3) the recognized or prospective error rates for a specific
technique; (4) any principles and controls appropriate to the science;
and (5) the level of acceptance in the pertinent scientific community.60
Though post-Daubert evidentiary standards have equated the
case with the aforementioned factors, 61 the Court expressed a reluctance to enumerate any indisputable standard in reviewing the validity
of scientific-based expert witness testimony. 62 In a majority decision
delivered by Justice Blackmun, the Court urged against any strict
standard of review when determining the admissibility of novel or controversial scientific evidence:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony,
then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the
capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are appropriate. 63
59

Id.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
61 In determining whether a distinction between “scientific” and “technical” expert witness
testimony is necessary in the application of Daubert, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, held that “Daubert’s general principles apply to the
expert matters described in Rule 702. The Rule, in respect to all such matters, “establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability.” Id. at 149.
62 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
63 Id. (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) for authority, “the court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”).
60
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The Court in Daubert articulated a trust that the trial court will
ensure the relevance and reliability of scientific based expert witness
testimony. Nonetheless, the inherent complexity at the foundation of
novel scientific testimony results in a heightened probability of confusing the jury. 64 Additionally, the flexibility of Daubert provides for
extensive inconsistency in hired expert witnesses testifying to the validity of some novel scientific theory or methodology. 65 The combination of Daubert’s malleability and the shifting nature of novel scientific-testimony constructs an environment where expert witness
testimony can be founded upon pseudoscience lacking the sufficient
level of support with the appropriate relevant scientific community or
degree of quantifiable facts to be permissible in judicial proceedings. 66
The essence of this evidentiary standard, applied when deciding the admissibility of novel or controversial scientific evidence, reflects the necessity of peer-review among the relevant specified
Sofia Adrogue, The Post-Daubert Court - “Amateur Scientist” Gatekeeper or Executioner?, HOUS. LAW., Mar-Apr 1998, at 10.
65 See Pullins v. Stihl Inc., No. 03-5343, 2006 WL 1390586, at *3, *5 (E.D. Pa. May 19,
2006) (involving a product liability case where the plaintiff alleged a deficiency in a machine
to cut flooring failed to shut off accurately, which resulted in the plaintiff’s leg injury. Id, at
*1. The expert witness for the plaintiff constructed and videotaped two distinguishable examinations encompassing approximately twenty minutes that corroborated the plaintiff’s product
liability allegations. Id. at *3. The first examination consisted of observing the machine
“when strapped between two desk chairs in the plaintiff’s counsel’s conference room.” Id.
The following examination consisted of “observing the machine when placed on a cord in the
expert’s driveway.” Id. The expert, who constructed the entire project, testified that he could
not recall the model (the machine was available in a variety of models)the plaintiff maneuvered and furthermore, caused the plaintiff’s alleged injury, or explain the various details of
his expert testing and standards. Id. at *3. The court held that the expert’s methods and
resulting conclusions “can only be described as exactly the kind of ‘junk science’ that Daubert sought to purge from the federal courts.” Id. The court, entrusted with the duty of being
the “gatekeeper,” disallowed the expert’s aforementioned faulty testimony, as well as that of
another expert who based his findings solely on the same unreliable tests. Id. at *4-5;
See also supra, note 21 (referring to the holding in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984
(5th Cir. 1997), “the Fifth Circuit reviewed other circuit opinions as to whether Daubert is
limited to novel scientific techniques or mythologies, and agreeing with the rationale employed by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, found the Daubert ‘criteria equally applicable to
technical, or other specialized knowledge.’ According to the Fifth Circuit, ‘whether the expert
would opine on economic valuation, advertising psychology, or engineering, application of
the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun or a person
whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it would among his
professional peers.’”). Id.
66 King, 733 S.E.2d at 536 (arguing against the broadened standard of admissibility under
Daubert, “Daubert was ostensibly to assist with the ongoing controversy over “junk science,”
“hired gun experts,” etc. The opinion, however, arguably contains few bright line tests that
most experts pass. On the other hand, it does include plenty of quotable language to support
almost any position.).
64
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scientific community when analyzing complex scientific theories and
methodologies. 67 However, it is crucial to note that scientific-based
testimony is not the only evidentiary category that should be subject to
rigorous standards of review to ensure reliability, relevance, and credibility.68 Even the most simple human perceptions can be deceptive
and complexed.
III.

THE INHERENT FAULTS OF THE HUMAN MIND’S ABILITY TO
PROCESS EVENTS & THE RESULTING EFFECT ON THE
RELIABILITY OF PERCEPTION, CONSTRUCTION & FALLACIES

Dr. Elizabeth Loftus is considered an expert in the study of human memories and famous for her research in the 1970s and 1980s,
which analyzed the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 69 The research
Dr. Loftus conducted on human memory and its distortion assessed the
reliability of eyewitness testimony in response to a constructed simulation of a crime scene or accident by exposing the participants to misinformation. The studies included leading questions or accounts of the
event by media outlets to determine whether the additional stimulus
affected the participants’ ability to accurately recall the fabricated
event. 70 Dr. Loftus described the process of the human memory as:
Involving the construction or reconstruction of experiences where a person may blend later occurring details
67 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (holding peer review to be a “pertinent consideration,” stating
that some theories are “too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But
submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in
part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.”
68 Kern, supra note 35.
69 Dr. Elizabeth Loftus is a distinguished professor specializing in cognitive psychology,
human memory, psychology and law. She received her Ph.D. from Stanford University, and
currently teaches at UC Irvine. Anne March & Greta Lorge, How the Truth Gets Twisted:
Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus Has Devoted Her Career to Proving that Memories Don’t Just
Fade, They Can Also Change. STANFORD MAGAZINE. (2012), https://webfiles.uci.edu/eloftus/Marsh_TwistedTruth_Loftus_StanfordMagNov
*+Dec2012.PDF?uniq=jd430q.
70 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1262 (discussing the continued research conducted by Dr. Loftus
in the 1990s:
“She further elaborated that her research in the 1990’s expanded the theories of misinformation
to see whether people could be implanted with entirely false memories, for example, by making a person think that he or she had been lost in a shopping mall as a child. She explained
that one quarter of the persons involved in this experiment believed in the false memory of
being lost.”).
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into the memory of an event. She explained that many
things could affect the accuracy of a memory, including
factors related to the perception of an event as it occurs,
such as lighting and distance and the exposure to post
event information such as leading questions or media
coverage, which can distort or supplement a memory.
Dr. Loftus also explained that the passage of time made
memories weaker and thus more vulnerable to post
event contamination. She explained that a false
memory is a false belief accompanied by sensory detail. 71
Additionally, Dr. Loftus has testified that it is “virtually impossible without independent corroboration” to distinguish an accurate
memory from a false memory. 72 This illustrates two predominant concerns in allowing expert testimony supporting the validity of false
memories. First, the inability to definitively, or even presumptively,
determine whether or not a memory is truthful or deceptive and second,
how an individual can sincerely believe that a false memory is an accurate recollection to a perceived event. 73
In order to properly analyze the faults innate to the human
mind’s process of perceiving and constructing memories, it is essential
to recognize that the human memory can be broken down into four
distinct stages: encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval. 74
Memory repression or dissociative amnesia is a wholly distinct cognitive process, completely removed from the mind’s habitual cognitive
process. 75 The process of repressing a once conscious memory allegedly involves “the forcing of ideas, perceptions or memories associated

71

Id.
Id.
73 Id.
74 See J. Douglas Bremner et al., Neural Mechanisms in Dissociative Amnesia for Childhood Abuse: Relevance to the Current Controversy Surrounding the “False Memory Syndrome,” 153 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 71, 72 (1996).
75 See Linda M. Williams, What Does it Mean to Forget Child Sexual Abuse? A Reply to
Loftus, Garry, and Feldman, 62 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1182, 1183 (1994)
(“Memories of sexual abuse may be encoded, stored, and retrieved differently from other
memories, especially when the abuse occurs under circumstances of high arousal, terror, extreme ambivalence, where escape is impossible, or when the meaning of the abuse could be
devastating if confronted.”).
72
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with psychic trauma from conscious awareness into the unconscious.” 76
A.

Understanding the Phenomenon Known as
Repressed Memory Syndrome or Dissociative
Amnesia

Given the nature of the evidence often derived from a repressed
memory, 77 it is fitting that Sigmund Freud proposed the first documented theory attempting to rationalize the enigmatic cognitive process that is dissociative amnesia. 78 Freud theorized that an individual
represses the memory of an event as a “defense mechanism that serves
to repudiate or suppress emotions, needs, feelings or intentions in order
to prevent psychic pain.” 79 Moreover, Freud argued that the human
mind’s process of repressing a traumatic event from the individual’s
apparent consciousness is comparable to a “layer by layer excavation
of a buried city, that should proceed slowly.” 80 The American Psychiatric Association (hereinafter “APA”) first recognized the cognitive
process underlying repressed memory syndrome by the medical term,

Stan Abrams, False Memory Syndrome v. Total Repression, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 283,
283 (1995); See also Doe v. Roe, 955 F.2d, See Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 957 (defining repressed
memory or dissociative amnesia as “a psychological defense mechanism that protects the individual from being confronted with the memory of an event that is too traumatic to cope
with”); Bremner et al., at 71-72 (“In dissociative amnesia, which can be associated with exposure to psychological trauma, information is not available to conscious awareness for an
extended period of time, although it may have an influence on behavior.”). See also Laura
Johnson, Litigating Nightmares: Repressed Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 939, 942 (2000).
77 R. Joseph, The Neurology of Traumatic “Dissociative” Amnesia: Commentary and Literature Review, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 715, 721 (1999) (While Joseph noted that most
cases of dissociative amnesia occur in cases involving child sexual abuse, he nevertheless emphasized the importance in acknowledging that “[t]raumatic dissociative amnesia, however, is
not limited to children, but includes, “hardened soldiers,” as well as, presumably, normal
adults.”).
78 Elizabeth Loftus & Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse, 50 (1996).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 51. However, Freud later rejected this detailed theory about repression, instead,
arguing that dissociative amnesia involved “sexual fantasies that engaged adult hysteria” and
other scientists and researchers produced studies that “support Freud’s originally hypothesized
connection between child sexual abuse, no recall of the abuse, and high levels of psychological
symptoms in adulthood, at least in clinical samples.” See Linda M. Williams, Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women’s Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J. OF
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1167, 1168 (1994).
76
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dissociative amnesia in the fourth edition of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published in 1994:
The essential feature of Dissociate Amnesia is an inability to recall important personal information, usually
of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too extensive
to be explained by normal forgetfulness. . . This disorder involves a reversible memory impairment in which
memories of personal experience cannot be retrieved in
a verbal form (or, if temporarily retrieved, cannot be
wholly retained in consciousness. . .) 81
The controversy surrounding dissociative amnesia mostly involves cases concerning memories of later recalled childhood sexual
abuse. 82 Although experts in the field of psychiatry have agreed that
the trauma inflicted by childhood sexual abuse may relate to the human
mind’s ability to repress the memory of this traumatic event, these
same experts debate the reliability of such memories in the context of
legal proceedings. 83
B.

Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome or Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome

Repressed memories are most frequently the products of sexual
abuse occurring at a young age. 84 Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome or
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome was developed in the
mid-1980s to explain the behaviors of child sexual abuse victims. 85
Initially introduced as a “theoretical model” in 1982, Child Sexual
Abuse Syndrome consisted of five behavioral phases observed in children who have been the victim of sexual abuse: (1) non-sexual engagement by the offender; (2) sexual activity occurs; (3) the offender
uses rewards or threats to keep the child quiet; (4) disclosure by the
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 478 (4th ed. 1994).
Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 129, 135 (1993) (In acknowledging the correlation between childhood sexual
abuse and dissociative amnesia, Loftus and Ernsdorff concluded that: “it is widely accepted
by clinicians that the particulars of the trauma are especially conducive to repression of
memory of the incident.”).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Max R. Selver, Sex Abuse Validation Testimony: Ripe for A Frye Challenge, 41
HARBINGER 287, 288 (2017).
81
82
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child; and (5) suppression by the child. 86 The following year, Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome was introduced to detail the
same behavioral patterns in abused children. This also consisted of
five phases: “(1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and
(5) retraction.” 87 Critically, the psychiatrists who developed these behavioral concepts cautioned that they are not to be used as “diagnostic
tools.” Moreover, both theoretical models are not to be used as uniform determinates as to whether a child was the victim of sexual
abuse. 88 Converse to the abovementioned warnings, the factors enunciated by both psychological theories were broadly applied leading to
erroneous and troubling allegations of child sexual abuse. 89
The application and prominence of Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome (hereinafter “CSAS”) or Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (hereinafter “CSAAS”) reached its peak in the late 1980s
through the early 1990s, amidst what is presently considered “the satanic panic:” a period of sensationalized nationwide hysteria that dominated American news and media outlets. 90 In 1988, New Jersey children’s daycare teacher, Margaret Kelly Michaels, was falsely
convicted of 115 counts of sexual abuse committed against a child on
twenty of her students, none of which she committed. 91 Michaels was
sentenced to forty-seven years in prison. 92

86 Dr. Suzanne Sgroi introduced this concept in 1982 in her book, Handbook of Clinical
Intervention in Child Sexual Abuse. Id.
87 Dr. Rowland Summit introduced this analogous theory in 1983 in his article The Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 181 (1983). Id.
88 See Avi Springer & Patrick Clark, Challenging Validation Testimony Through Frye
Hearings (2015) (detailing how Dr. Summit and Dr. Sgroi “qualified their theories in important ways”); Suzanne M. Sgroi, Handbook of Clinical Intervention in Child Sexual Abuse
12-36, at 78 (1982) (“Behavioral indicators of child sexual abuse may be helpful but are rarely
conclusive.”); Mary Meinig, Profile on Roland Summit, 1 VIOLENCE UPDATE 6, 6 (1991) (“The
accommodation syndrome is neither an illness or a diagnosis, and it can’t be used to measure
whether or not a child has been sexually abused.”).
89 Selver, supra note 85.
90 See Sarah Hughes, American Monsters: Tabloid Media and the Satanic Panic, 1970–
2000, 51 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES 691, 691–719 (2017); Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid
Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 519, 520 (2000)
(“The parental panic has its recent origins in the early 1980s, when a wave of child molestation
cases raised public awareness and gripped the country”); See generally Bette L. Bottoms and
Suzanne L. Davis, The Creation of Satanic Ritual Abuse, 16 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 2, 112-32, https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.1997.16.2.112 (1997).
91 Selver, supra note 85.
92 Id.
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An in-depth article about the trial in Harper’s Magazine
explained that “[p]erhaps the most important witness
for the prosecution” was a psychologist, acting as validator, who testified that each of the twenty children suffered from CSAAS. This testimony was offered as
proof that Ms. Kelly Michaels sexually abused them.
According to the psychologist, children who repeatedly
denied abuse were in Dr. Sgroi’s “suppression phase,”
and children who showed affection toward Ms. Kelly
Michaels were in Dr. Sgroi’s “engagement phase.” 93
The malleability of the five phases indicative of CAAS or
CSAAS constructs a broad application with the ability to conform to
the behavior of nearly any child. 94 The supporting expert witness testimony convicting Michaels illustrates this flexibility.95 More importantly, it demonstrates the overall weight and power of expert witness testimony in a trial concerning child sexual abuse. 96 Specifically,
the supporting expert testimony worked to verify accusations that can
only be described as extraordinary, including allegations that
Michaels: “raped [the] children with silverware, wooden spoons,
Legos and light bulbs, that she played ‘Jingle Bells’ on the piano while
naked, taken [sic] their temperature rectally and forced them to eat excrement off the floor.” 97
Margaret Kelly Michaels’ conviction was overruled in 1992 by
a New Jersey State appellate court. 98 The court justified its ruling by
the state’s improper use of expert testimony as validation and substantive evidence against Michaels to prove that the children involved
were, in fact, victims of sexual abuse. 99 The children’s disturbing
claims, described earlier as “extraordinary,” were falsely verified by
Id. at 288-89.
Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 519, 521 (2000); See also Nancy Haas, Margaret Kelly Michaels Wants Her
Innocence Back, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 37; Elliot Pinsley, Wee-Care
Teacher Asks for Mistrial over Hearsay Evidence, Record (N.J), Feb. 12, 1988, at A3.
98 State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 496 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994)
(citing John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 67–68 (1989) (“the proper use of child-abuse expert testimony is as a rehabilitative
tool and not as a diagnostic investigative device, as ‘[t]he syndrome does not detect sexual
abuse.’”). State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 594.
99 Id.
93
94
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the use of expert testimony. 100 Unfortunately, this case was not unique
and was merely one of the many cases that involved improper convictions based on false claims of child sexual abuse, further demonstrating
the “satanic panic” hysteria which characterized the late eighties proceeding into the early nineties. 101 Notably, this included an “investigation in Wenatchee, Washington, in which forty-three adults were arrested on more than twenty-nine thousand charges of sex abuse
involving sixty-eight children” and the unsettling number of wrongful
convictions, later overturned, which laid in the wake of the national
media craze. 102
100 The Court in State v. Michaels, discussed the troubles facing the scientific community,
specifically in regard to professionals within the psychiatric community asked to testify in
criminal child sexual abuse cases. Id. at 500. The court notes opinions within the psychiatric
community that convey the belief that therapists, psychologists, and other mental health professionals should not disclose their belief as to whether the alleged abuse in fact occurred,
arguing that absolute determinations of guilt are out of the realm of psychological opinion. Id;
Marian D. Hall, The Role of Psychologists As Experts in Cases Involving Allegations of Child
Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 451, 462 (1989) (explaining the troubles facing the scientific
community with regards to expert testimony in cases involving allegations of child sexual
abuse:
“[i]t would appear that the prospect of designing checklists, inventories, and rating-scales to
provide objective measures of abusive behavior, its antecedents, correlates, and consequences,
holds promise of yielding information that may be useful both in individual and epidemiological data gathering. Designing and validating such measures, however, depends on theory and
research that is currently the focus of much study and controversy. Nowhere is that more
evident than in the scientific and legal arguments about whether behaviors exist that are unique
to sexually abused children and whether such behaviors fall into patterns that suggest a typical
’profile’” or ’syndrome’ for the child sexual abuse victim. Children’s reactions to sexual abuse
vary dramatically and, to date, the methodological problems involved in compiling results of
the scores of diverse studies have led only to lists of very general symptoms, which occur to
some extent in all children, and are especially prevalent in children who suffer from various
forms of emotional trauma, separation, or loss of security.”). Id.
101 Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 519, 522 (2000).
“The constant media attention was crucial to how the cases were perceived by the public and
professionals. These highly publicized cases raised public awareness about child sex-abuse
and, more generally, the child care industry. In response to the wave of reported child abuse
incidents, numerous nonprofit organizations stepped up child abuse education and prevention
programs and national attention was focused on the need for quality, affordable child care.
But raising public awareness through unrelenting news coverage of notorious crimes also
alarms viewers and raises irrational fears. Projecting fears onto parents was done in an overt
fashion at times. For example, a 1984 article in the Washington Post warned that “[t]he California child-molesting story has got to chill the heart of every parent who has left a child with
a babysitter or put a child in a day-care center.” Id.
102 See Lynn Sweet, On a Quest for Vindication, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 1999, at 30 (detailing the false sexual molestation allegations made against the owner of Kids Stop and
Mother Goose day care center located in the suburbs of Chicago by four young girls under her
care in 1997). An analogous situation occurred in Maryland where thirteen children falsely
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More recently, in 2011, the Court of Appeals of New York, in
People v. Spicola, upheld a licensed clinical social worker’s testimony
relating to CSAAS being offered to “rehabilitate the complainant’s
credibility” who did not report the abuse until several years following
the alleged acts. 103 Nonetheless, the social worker emphasized that
CSAAS, in spite of its name, was not a diagnosis; instead, “it describes
a range of behaviors observed in cases of validated child sexual
abuse.” 104 The expert stressed that the existence or nonexistence of a
particular behavior is not substantive evidence that the complainant
was the victim of sexual abuse. 105 Furthermore, the social worker was
not apprised of any of the facts of the case and testified objectively to
the characteristics accompanying CSAAS. 106 Notably, the court in
Spicola sustained the scientific validity of CSAAS, at least for the purpose for which it was offered and the defense failed to question “the
empirical basis for delayed reporting.” 107 Instead, the defense criticized the frequency of denial and recantation in cases involving
CSAAS, aspects the Court of Appeals of New York held to be not at
issue in the present case. 108 However, denial, recantation and changes
or fabrications in recollections are common in cases involving any
early memory, especially those involving traumatic events. 109
accused daycare workers of sexual abuse. See Steve Crane, Woman Maintains Innocence in
Preschoolers’ Abuse Case, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 1989, at B1; Richard Beck, We Believe The
Children, xxii (2015) (“Eighteen of the accused, nearly all of whom were poor and on welfare
and some of whom were illiterate or mentally handicapped, were convicted in the mid-1990s.)
Id. The last of them was not released from prison until 2000. Id. City and county officials
were found negligent in their conduct of the investigation in a civil lawsuit in 2001”); See
Mike Barber & Larry Lange, Jury Finds City, County Negligent in Child Sex Ring
Case, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (July 31, 2001), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Jury-finds-city-county-negligent-in-child-sex-1061384.php
[https://perma.cc/Y87N4RB7].
103 In People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 442, 947 N.E.2d 620 (2011), the defense attacked
the complainant’s credibility “principally on the basis that he neglected to report the alleged
abuse promptly and continued to associate with defendant after the abuse was claimed to have
taken place. The legitimate purpose of the expert’s testimony was to counter defendant’s inference that the complainant’s behavior was inconsistent with having been molested.” Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 “Although, as a whole, the expert’s testimony certainly supported the complainant’s
credibility by supplying explanations other than fabrication for his post-molestation behavior,
the expert did not express an opinion on the complainant’s credibility.” Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Consider Elizabeth Loftus’s famous 1995 “lost in the mall” study in which participants
were told that they were lost in a shopping mall as a child and many of the individuals would
falsely “remember” the traumatic event and some even fabricated the experience. Gary M.
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The reappearance and validation of CSAAS illustrate the dangers ignited by the “satanic panic” period of media hysteria in the
United States, foreshadowing the possible consequences in permitting
expert witness testimony to validate criminal accusations not grounded
within a proper scientific method. Furthermore, the cases which encompass this phase of media-induced fear and paranoia demonstrate
the often-inconsistent nature of scientific opinions and the harmful
consequences which follow the hasty application of contested psychiatric theories. 110
C.

Wavering Opinions Regarding the Validity of
Recovered Repressed Memories Within the
Relevant Scientific Community

The debate relating to recovered repressed memories or dissociative amnesia has enthralled the psychiatric community for decades. 111 In 1997, two professionals in the field of memory research
noted that “the recovered memories debate is the most passionately
contested battle [ever] waged about the nature of human memory,” and
psychiatric professionals involved in the debate found “their competence, motives, and even integrity called into question.” 112 The discussion has consistently been characterized by “strong emotions and often
by outright acrimony” even among professionals. 113 These strong
emotions were first made apparent by the inability of six experts in the
field of psychiatry (three clinicians and three researchers) to agree on
the validity of the phenomenon. 114 The American Psychological
Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling
the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129,
135 (1993).
110 See Gerstein v. Senkowski, 426 F.3d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting a leading psychologist for the conclusion that “the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome . . . has no
validity and is not regularly accepted in the scientific community”); See also Jill Birnbaum,
NAT’L CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, INC., Expert Testimony in Custody and Visitation
Cases Involving Child Sexual Abuse 699 (1990) (“Unlike some other syndromes, such as battered women’s syndrome or rape victim’s syndrome, the child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome was not created as a diagnostic tool, and children who display signs of the syndrome
may not have been abused.”).
111 Id.
112 August Piper et. al., What’s Wrong with Believing in Repression? A Review for Legal
Professionals, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 223, 230 (2008).
113 Id.
114 This group included experts across the field of psychiatry who continued to publish differing opinions regarding the phenomenon known as dissociative amnesia or recovered
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Association assembled the group in 1993 with the task of reviewing
“the scientific literature on adults’ previously unrecalled memories of
childhood sex abuse, and to make recommendations to the Association
to inform future discourse.” 115 Unfortunately, this task proved to be
quite difficult, and the group of professionals was unable to reach a
uniform consensus, failing to publish the report for which it was employed. 116 Instead, the clinicians published their findings, as the researchers too published their differing conclusions, and each even published specific replies to the other’s publications. 117 Seven leading
scientific journals further illustrate the skepticism surrounding repressed memories and dissociative amnesia: 118
The American Medical Association considers recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse to be of uncertain authenticity, which should be subject to external
verification. The use of recovered memories is fraught
with problems of potential misapplication (American
Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs,
1995, p. 117). If memories of events have not been revisited and cognitively rehearsed in the interval between occurrence of the events and attention being paid
to them some years later, it is not clear that such memories can endure, be accessible, or be reliable (Canadian
Psychiatric Association, 1996, p. 305). Existing scientific evidence does not allow global statements to be
made about a definite relationship between trauma and
memory. The available scientific and clinical evidence
does not allow accurate, inaccurate, and fabricated
memories to be distinguished [from one another] in the

repressed memories: E. F. Loftus, P. A. Ornstein, C.A. Courtois, S.J. Ceci, L.S. Brown, and
J.L. Alpert. Id. See generally P.A. Ornstein, S. J. Ceci, & E. F Loftus, Comment on Alpert,
Brown, and Courtois: The science of memory and the practice of psychotherapy (1998).
PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW, 4(4), 996-1010 (1998); J. L. Alpert, L. S. Brown, &
C. A. Courtois, Reply to Ornstein, Ceci, and Loftus (1998): The politics of memory.
PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW, 4(4), 1011-1024 (1998).
115 Piper, supra note 112.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 These journals include: the American Psychiatric Association, the American Medical
Association, the Canadian Psychiatric Association, the Australian Psychological Society, and
the (British) Royal College of Psychiatrists. Id. at 230-31.
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absence of independent corroboration (Australian Psychological Society, Limited, 1994, p. 2). 119
By the late 1990s, merely a quarter of psychiatrists polled
stated they believed dissociative amnesia is supported by strong scientific evidence. 120 Currently, skepticism surrounding the phenomenon
remains high among the psychiatric community; moreover, the current
emphasis of the debate focuses on the danger of false and sometimes
implanted memories, leading to false allegations which the accuser
wholeheartedly believes to be authentic. 121 Notably, current experts in
the field of psychiatry emphasize the human memory’s inability to
flawlessly recall past events, recognizing memories to be reconstructive as opposed to reproductive. 122 The reconstructive nature of the
human memory suggests that most individuals have constructed false
memories, devoid of any conscious intention, as observed by William
James, 123 more than a century ago:
False memories are by no means rare occurrences in
most of us . . . Most people probably are in doubt about
certain matters ascribed to their past. They may have
seen them, may have said them, done them, or they may
only have dreamed or imagined they did so. 124
Misconceptions as to the human mind’s ability to accurately
recall previously perceived events have consequently led to the implementation of retrieval methods that may be harmful or suggestive.125
In general, detailed and vivid memories that are emotional in nature
are easier to recall and more likely to be held with the utmost confidence regardless of the recollection’s accuracy. 126 However, memories naturally become distorted over time as an individual perceives

Id. at 230-31.
Id.
121 S. J. Lynn, J. Evans, J. R Laurence, & S.O. Lilienfeld, What Do People Believe About
Memory? Implications for the Science and Pseudoscience of Clinical Practice. CANADIAN
JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY, 60(12), 541–47 (2015).
122 Id.
123 William James (1842-1910) was a psychologist and philosopher who was instrumental
to the inception of the psychology department at Harvard University. For more information
about William James see https://psychology.fas.harvard.edu/people/william-james.
124 Lynn, supra note 121. (citing William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1
(1890)).
125 Lynn, supra note 121.
126 Id.
119
120
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and stores new events into his or her mind’s limited storage space for
memories:
Even in cases of emotionally compelling, so-called
flashbulb memories—memories marked by a seemingly photographic quality—recollections often change
substantially over time, as documented by studies of the
catastrophic breakup of the space shuttle Challenger,
the trial verdict of football star O J Simpson, the death
of Princess Diana, and the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Dekel and Bonanno conducted repeated memory assessments of survivors of the September 11th attacks
who had witnessed them directly, and found considerable variation in memory reports at 7, compared with 18,
months. 127
Experts in the field of psychiatry note that individuals who
were “resilient in the face of trauma” construct a more neutral, “benign,” recollection of the event over time, while individuals who report
suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder have more stable and consistent memories. 128 Though psychiatric professionals are unsure of
the reasoning behind this finding, it is apparent that recollections of
past events are malleable and memories become distorted as they pass
through the encoding process 129 on to the consolidation and storage

127 Id. (citing U. Neisser & N. Harsch, Phantom Flashbulbs: False Recollections of Hearing
the News About Challenger, Affect and Accuracy in Recall: Studies of “Flashbulb” Memories,
EMORY SYMPOSIA IN COGNITION, 9–31 (1992); H. Schmolck, E.A. Buffalo, & L.R. Squire,
Memory Distortions Develop Over Time: Recollections of the O.J. Simpson Trial Verdict After
15 and 32 Months, 1 PSYCHOL SCI. 11, 39-45 (2000); E. Krackow, S.J. Lynn, D. Payne, The
Death of Princess Diana: The Effects of Memory Enhancement Procedures on Flashbulb
Memories, IMAGIN COGN PERS. 25, 197–220 (2005); W. Hirst & E.A. Phelps, A Ten-year Follow-up of a Study of Memory for the Attack of September 11, 2001: Flashbulb Memories and
Memories for Flashbulb Events, EXP PSYCHOL GEN. 144(3):604-23 (2015); Dekel S, Bonanno,
Changes in Trauma Memory and Patterns of Posttraumatic Stress, PSYCHOL TRAUMA.
2013;5(1):26–34; S.M. Southwick & C.A. Morgan III, Consistency of Memory for CombatRelated Traumatic Events in Veterans of Operation Desert Storm, AM J PSYCHIATRY (1997)).
128 Lynn, supra note 121.
129 The encoding stage is the brain’s process of constructing “memory code” which is necessary to store information perceived from an event into a memory. Ruth Lee Johnson, J.D.,
How Does the Law Treat Repressed Memories?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 09, 2016,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/so-sue-me/201602/how-does-the-law-treat-repressed-memories.
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stages 130 before a memory is retrieved. 131 A study involving U.S. veterans of the Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm observed that nearly
ninety-percent of the veterans recalled different memories when questioned about the same traumatic experience after merely two years
from the perceived event. 132 As indicated by laboratory research, an
individual may correspondingly recall an event to be more traumatic,
bearing more emotion and disturbance with the passage of time. 133 A
study performed by experts from John Jay College of Criminal Justice
reported that its participants mistakenly claimed to have witnessed
twenty-six percent of the brief clips omitted from an unsettling film
depicting a gruesome car accident that displayed the deaths of five
adults and an infant. 134 The study’s participants were particularly
prone to falsely recall, with the sincerest confidence, the most traumatic and gruesome portions of the film. 135
The malleability and impressionable nature of a memory is illustrated by the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, even when the
witness testifies with certainty and confidence. Moreover, suggestive
techniques used during psychotherapy can falsely implant memories
of complex occurrences. 136 Consequently, individuals have falsely recalled events involving being the victim of one or more bullies, committing one or more criminal acts, riding a hot-air balloon, and being
the victim of a serious animal attack. 137 An individual’s specificity in
recalling an event and the emotion he or she attaches to the memory
has no bearing on its validity. 138 Fallacies can occur during any of the
mind’s numerous processes in creating, storing, and retrieving
The consolidation and storages stages are the brain’s process of maintaining the abovementioned “memory code” over time. Id.
131 The retrieval stage is the process of recovering stored memories. Id.
132 Lynn, supra note 121. The group of veterans were questioned about the same traumatic
experience, one month after its occurrence. Id. The same group of veterans were then questioned about the same occurrence two years later. Id. It was then observed that 88% of the
veterans recalled the same event differently. Id.
133 D. Strange & M.K. Takarangi, False Memories for Missing Aspects of Traumatic Events,
ACTA PSYCHOL (AMST). 141(3):322-6 (2012).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Johnson, supra note 129.
137 M. Garry & K.A. Wade, Actually, a Picture is Worth Less Than 45 Words: Narratives
Produce More False Memories than Photographs Do, PSYCHON BULL REV. 2005 Apr;
12(2):359-66; J. Shaw & S. Porter, Constructing Rich False Memories of Committing Crime,
PSYCHOL SCI. 2015 Mar; 26(3):291-301.
138 B.E. Bell, E.F. Loftus, Degree of Detail of Eyewitness Testimony and Mock Juror Judgments. J APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL., 1988;18(14):1171–1192.
130
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memories. 139 During the encoding stage, an imagined occurrence may
be constructed as a perceived event, thus creating a false memory. 140
Moreover, studies demonstrate that a lack of sleep may negatively affect memory consolidation and storage. 141 Finally, at the retrieval
stage, memories may be falsely recalled when produced by certain
tasks or prompts; thus, the retrieval process is especially vulnerable to
the tactics employed by psychotherapists. 142
The recent scientific observation finding the human memory to
be constructive bears strong implications for the admission of recovered repressed memories during criminal proceedings; conversely, the
human mind’s incapacity to subconsciously preserve our memories
flawlessly, while remaining accessible through therapeutic recovery
methods, should bear equal consequence. 143 The notion of a repressed
memory found its inception with Sigmund Freud. 144 However, modern
psychotherapeutic methods that aim to recover memories repressed
from the holder’s own conscious awareness lack the necessary support
among the psychiatric community to be properly admitted into evidence during a criminal proceeding, even when analyzed under the
more flexible Daubert standard. 145
D.

The Vague, Elusive, and Constructive Nature of
Memory as Illustrated During Brett Kavanaugh’s
Confirmation to the United States Supreme Court

Memories are not impeccable because the mind does not function as a video camera, recording each detail of an event and searing it
into an accurate and detailed memory of an event. 146 Generally, humans as a whole are “best adapted for accumulating knowledge for
Johnson, supra note 129.
Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Lynn, supra note 121.
144 March, supra note 69.
145 As discussed, the standards for the admission of expert witness testimony into evidence,
during a criminal proceeding, are as follows: (1) whether the expert has a theory and methodology that has the ability to be tested, and if it has in fact been tested; (2) whether the expert
has a theory and methodology that has been the subject of research, peer-review, case study,
and publication; (3) the recognized or prospective error rates for a specific technique; (4) any
principles and controls appropriate to the science; and (5) the level of acceptance in the pertinent scientific community. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
146 Tom Singer, To Tell The Truth, Memory Isn’t That Good, 63 MONT. L. REV. 337, 359
(2002).
139
140
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inference, approximation, concept formation, and classification not for
the literal retention of the individual exemplars that lead to and support
general knowledge.” 147 Consequently, unflawed detailed recall of an
event in the years that follow is virtually unachievable. This inherent
fault was exemplified during Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation
to the United States Supreme Court in 2018 when Dr. Christine Blasey
Ford accused Justice Kavanaugh of sexually assaulting her at a party
when they both were in high school. 148 This Note will not attempt to
substantiate or repudiate Dr. Ford’s allegations; instead, this is an opportunity to shed some light on how the memory process functions
within the context of a relevant national discussion.
Dr. Ford contended that she was always conscious of the assault, though only beginning to speak openly about it during a couple’s
therapy session with her husband in 2012.149 In the time that followed,
Dr. Ford stated that she did her best to “suppress memories of the assault” because recalling the event caused her a great deal of trauma and
anxiety. 150 This is distinguishable from cases involving alleged repressed memories, a form of suppression where an individual subconsciously blocks the memory of an event from his or her conscious recall. 151 Dr. Ford affirmed that after her initial disclosure in couple’s
therapy she recalled the event further during individual therapy sessions on a few occasions. 152 Dr. Ford publicly disclosed the details of
this event in July of 2018 following Justice Kavanaugh’s imminent appointment to the Supreme Court by President Donald Trump. 153
This ignited a parochial uproar in the court of public opinion in
which the U.S. twenty-four-hour news media cycle divided on partisan
lines to either unabashedly support or discredit Dr. Ford’s claims. 154
Thus, parties on one end of the political spectrum emphasized Dr.
Ford’s lack of detail in recalling the assault, citing her inability to
147

Id.
Written Test. Of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, S. Judiciary Comm., 2 (Sept. 26, 2018).
149 Id. at 4.
150 Id.
151 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, supra note 81.
152 Written Test. Of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 148.
153 Id. at 4-5.
154 Compare Steve Benen, Dr. Ford is ‘100 Percent’ Certain About Her Kavanaugh Allegation, Sept. 27, 2018 http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/dr-ford-100-percent-certain-about-her-kavanaugh-allegation with Scott A. Johnson, Christine Blasey Ford’s Accusations Against Brett Kavanaugh: A Case for Discussion, FORENSIC RES. CRIMINAL INT. J.
2019;7(1):1‒10. DOI:10.15406/frcij.2019.07.00257.
148
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recollect the location or owner of the house where the party and subsequent assault transpired 155 while those in opposition supported the
accuracy of Dr. Ford’s accounts on their face. 156
To this end, most fail to note that memories relating to events
that occurred more than thirty-years prior are ambiguous and shaded
gray; this does not allow for black and white inferences as to their accuracy. Distortion in recollection is unavoidable, “memory is distortion since memory is invariably and inevitably selective. A way of
seeing is a way of not seeing, a way of remembering is a way of forgetting, too.” 157 If memory were merely a system of recording, “a
‘true’ memory might be possible. But memory is a process of encoding information, storing information, and strategically retrieving information, and there are social, psychological, and historical influences at
each point.” 158 Any genuine allegation pertaining to an event that
arose more than thirty-years prior conveys a degree of ambiguity; furthermore, an elaborately detailed recollection of dated events illustrates the reconstructive nature of memory. The truth is, there is no
way to validate an allegation of sexual assault dating more than thirtyyears absent objective corroborating evidence which unfortunately is
lost with the passage of time. Nonetheless, the conscious suppression
of a memory must be distinguished from the unintentional repression
of a memory and its consequent retrieval through problematic therapeutic methods.
E.

Contemporary Psychiatric Intervention
Techniques Employed with the Goal of Retrieving
Repressed Traumatic Memories

In order to sufficiently allocate the appropriate degree of credibility to recovered repressed memories of traumatic events in the context of a criminal proceeding, it is crucial to be aware of the numerous
techniques employed by psychiatric professionals across the field to
155 Scott A. Johnson, Christine Blasey Ford’s Accusations Against Brett Kavanaugh: A
Case for Discussion, FORENSIC RES. CRIMINAL INT. J. 2019;7(1):1‒10.
DOI:10.15406/frcij.2019.07.00257, at 4.
156 Steve Benen, Dr. Ford is ‘100 Percent’ Certain About Her Kavanaugh Allegation, Sept.
27, 2018 http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/dr-ford-100-percent-certain-abouther-kavanaugh-allegation.
157 Michael Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past 346, 348 (Schacter ed. 1995).
158 Id.
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retrieve these so-called memories from an individual’s subconscious
to his or her conscious awareness. These methods include titles such
as alien abduction therapy, somatic experiencing therapy, reenactment
protocol, neuro-linguistic programming, sensorimotor psychotherapy,
experiential integration, energy approaches, and internal family systems therapy, “the last of which involves interaction and work with
putatively dissociated parts of the personality.” 159 Most, if not all, of
the abovementioned therapies, may be more accurately characterized
as pseudoscientific because they draw nearly all of their support from
anecdotal claims, as opposed to the more conventional use of controlled trial studies. 160 Furthermore, these therapeutic methods are often founded upon the false principle that memories are permanent and
preserved perfectly, and moreover, that memory retrieval is necessary
for positive therapeutic outcomes. 161 None of the abovementioned
principles presently hold any notable support within the scientific community. 162
F.

Memory Implantation: How a Third Party or
External Factors May Construct a False Memory

Research on the development of a false memory commonly
combines “suggestive techniques with social pressure” 163 to cause participants to recall memories that did not, in reality, occur. 164 Adult
research participants are led to believe that the researchers are primarily interested in how individuals recall childhood events. 165 Participants are presented with sets of childhood events containing one false
event created by the study’s researchers. Over the course of approximately one week, participants are encouraged to recall childhood
events by employing several memory recovery techniques used in

Lynn, supra note 121.
Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Alan Scoboria, Kimberley A. Wade, D. Stephen Lindsay, Tanjeem Azad, Deryn Strange,
James Ost & Ira E. Hyman, A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false
memory
implantation
studies,
Memory,
25:2,
146-163,
DOI:
10.1080/09658211.2016.1260747, 4 (2017).
164 These notable studies include: the “lost-in-the-mall” study (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), the
“memory implantation methodology” (Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002), and “familialinformant false narrative” (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). Id.
165 Id. at 5.
159
160

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/6

30

Malone: Admissibility of Recovered Memories

2020

ADMISSIBILITY OF RECOVERED MEMORIES

1225

“trauma-memory-oriented therapy (e.g., guided visualization).” 166 Researchers then determine the extent to which they were able to implant
a false memory in the subject during the final interview process.167
This method remains the most consistent in the psychiatric study of
memory implantation and retrieval. 168 Sadly, many cases involving
purported recovered repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse involve a member or multiple members of the complainant’s family in
some capacity. Simultaneously, researchers have found that telling
subjects that a family member provided the information relating to the
supposed events increased the likeliness that the subject would accept
the false event as a genuine memory. 169
In 2017, researchers compiled studies on false memory implantation from New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the
United States to determine the ability to implant a false memory in a
subject, and additionally, the frequency to which the individual
acknowledges the false event as an authentic childhood memory.170
When the findings were analyzed without considering the variations in
study techniques, it was found that more than thirty percent 171 of research participants were categorized as having constructed a false
memory and more than half 172 of the participants were considered to
have accepted the false suggested event as an authentic childhood
memory, to some extent. 173 Furthermore, when the findings were analyzed considering the specific research study conditions and psychiatric techniques employed, including “[t]he presence of idiosyncratic
self-related information, an imagination procedure during the suggestion, and to a lesser extent presenting the suggestion without a photo
depicting the specific event, were each associated with high memory
formation rates.” 174 Researchers found that when all three of the
abovementioned conditions were present, the false memory rate

Researchers commonly verify the occurrence of specific events during the participants’
childhood to ensure the integrity of the study. Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 12.
170 Id. at 16.
171 30.4% of participants were categorized as having formed a false memory. Id. at 28.
172 53.3% of the participants were considered to have accepted the false suggested event as
an authentic childhood memory, to some extent. Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
166
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increased to more than forty-six percent of participants 175 and the acceptance rate increased to nearly seventy percent. 176
Overall, the research demonstrates that if a false event is implied, or otherwise suggested, and evidence is afforded that the incident occurred, if opposition to contemplating the probability that the
event occurred can be overcome, and “if imagination is employed, then
false autobiographical memories often arise.” 177 Many individuals
who report having recovered a repressed memory have done so with
the intent to uncover some underlying trauma that may be at the root
of their present-day struggles. 178 The human mind’s ability to accept
a suggested event, and construct a false memory, is terrifying for the
obvious effects on an individual’s mental health because the subject
sincerely believes the false event to be an authentic memory; this is a
clear and disturbing invasion of privacy because an implanted memory
is an infiltration into the parts of the mind held most sacred to an individual. Furthermore, false-constructed memories become even more
dangerous when they have the ability to incarcerate innocent people,
and this dangerous consequence becomes increasingly more likely in
jurisdictions that have extended the statute of limitations for their criminal prosecution in cases involving allegations of sexual abuse that occurred when the complainant was a minor. 179

175 46.1% of participants constructed a false memory “when idiosyncratic self-related information, an imagination procedure during the suggestion, and to a lesser extent presenting
the suggestion without a photo depicting the specific event” were present study conditions.
Id.
176 69.7% of participants accepted the false event, to some degree, as an authentic memory,
given the abovementioned study conditions. Id.
177 Id. at 29.
178 Consider licensed therapist Barbara Snow, who voluntarily placed herself on vocational
probation with Utah’s state Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, in 2008,
following allegations of professional misconduct which included implanting false memories
in her family members. Lisa Rosetta, Embattled Therapist Agrees to Probation, The Salt Lake
Tribune
(January
22,
2008,
1:49am),
https://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=%2Fnews%2Fci_8332832 “Snow was involved in the prosecutions of a string of child sex abuse cases in the 1980s. One man she testified against was
granted a new hearing after the Utah Supreme Court questioned her credibility. Another man’s
conviction was upheld.” Id.
179 33A CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 186:12. (2019).
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NEW YORK’S CHILD VICTIMS ACT

New York is a leader in the movement to extend the statute of
limitations in cases involving childhood sexual abuse. 180 In early
2019, both the New York State Senate and the Assembly approved
modifications to the Child Victims Act which allows the victims of
childhood sexual abuse to file criminal charges until the time they turns
fifty-five years old. Prior to this legislation, the ability to file a criminal complaint was restricted to victims under the age of twenty-three
years old. 181 This change in legislation will certainly increase the number of criminal complaints stemming from an alleged recovered repressed memory. 182 Furthermore, the changes in New York’s Child
Victim’s Act inevitably lead to complainants and witnesses testifying
to an event that occurred more than twenty or even thirty years prior to
the formal commencement of criminal proceedings.
Furthermore, the legislation provides a “look back” period to
restore claims previously barred by the statute of limitations.183 The
law creates a window of time, extending one year, which shall commence six-months from the act’s effective date, allowing previously
time-barred claims to be filed in both civil and criminal court. 184 This
presents a flagrant constitutional issue. The Court in Stogner v. California, 185 held the retroactive use of newly enacted statutes of limitations to restore criminal claims formerly time-barred violates the 10th
amendment’s Ex-Post Facto Clause of the U.S Constitution.186
180

Id.
Id.
182 Id.
183 Marie Napoli, Child Victims Act Is a Step Toward Healing, New York Law Journal
(Online), March 7, 2019 https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/b21ca632-fe1d-422a-b51a60af0a35902b/?context=1000516.
184 Id.
185 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).
186 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.; See also Stogner, 539 U.S. at 612 (citing Justice Chase
more than two-hundred years prior in Calder v. Bull, supra:
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and
the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done
before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed
to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required
at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the
181
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Stogner v. California involved a California state law that was remarkably analogous New York Child Victim’s Act. 187 In 1993, the California state legislature enacted a statute permitting:
Prosecution for those crimes where “[t]he limitation period specified in [prior statutes of limitations] has expired”--provided that (1) a victim has reported an allegation of abuse to the police, (2) “there is independent
evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the
victim’s allegation,” and (3) the prosecution is begun
within one year of the victim’s report. A related provision, added to the statute in 1996, makes clear that a
prosecution satisfying these three conditions “shall revive any cause of action barred by [prior statutes of limitations].” 188
In Stogner, the defendant was charged with sex-related child
abuse in 1998 for acts that allegedly occurred between 1955 and
1973. 189 At this time, the statute of limitations for this crime was threeyears and that period expired at least twenty-two years prior to the
state’s petition. 190 The Court found the statute to be “unfairly retroactive” as applied to the case at bar and further held that “ a law enacted
after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously timebarred prosecution.” 191
Although this constitutional prohibition may bar future criminal allegations filed pursuant to New York’s “look back” period, it
does not extend to civil suits filed during this window. 192 Furthermore,
the New York State Court of Appeals held that the legislature “may
constitutionally revive a personal cause of action” under the reasonable
determination that “the circumstances are exceptional and are such as
to satisfy the court that serious injustice would result to plaintiffs not
guilty of any fault if the intention of the legislature were not

187
188
189
190
191
192

offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.” Calder, supra, at 390-391, 1 L Ed 648 (emphasis altered from original). Id.
Stogner, 539 U.S. at 609.
Id.
Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 633.
Napoli, supra note 183.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/6

34

Malone: Admissibility of Recovered Memories

2020

ADMISSIBILITY OF RECOVERED MEMORIES

1229

effectuated.” 193 These exceptional circumstances were found to exist
in the case of latent effects resulting from exposure to toxic substances,” though time will determine whether child sexual abuse will
be considered an analogous exceptional circumstance. 194
V.

CONCLUSION

The human memory involves “the construction or reconstruction of experiences where a person may blend later occurring details
into the memory of an event.” 195 The passage of time weakens the
mind’s memory of an event and, the memory is more susceptible to
contamination following the event. 196 Moreover, the American Medical Association categorizes recovered repressed memories of childhood abuse “to be of uncertain authenticity.” 197 Additionally, the association cautioned that: “[t]he use of recovered memories is fraught
with problems of potential misapplication,” 198 and existing clinical and
scientific evidence cannot distinguish accurate memories from those
that are fabricated and inaccurate absent independent information corroborating the event’s occurrence. 199 The memory is inherently fallible, consisting of merely two functions, construction and reconstruction, and in spite of true crime novels, there is no scientific evidence
supporting the belief that the mind can flawlessly preserve a memory,
and further, conceal a memory from an individual’s conscious recollection. 200
Therefore, criminal allegations based solely upon recently recovered repressed memories should not be admissible within the context of formal criminal proceedings because the notion of recovering a
preserved memory holds no scientific credibility. 201 The unconscionability of the criminal allegation cannot hinder the accused’s right to
Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164, 174-75, 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950).
See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989) (upholding the New York
State legislature’s discovery rule for “latent effects of exposure to any substance” and simultaneous one-year revival of lapsed actions because operation of “the exposure rule prevented
the bringing of timely actions,” and “an injustice has been rectified.”).
195 March, supra note 69.
196 Id. (citing testimony from Dr. Elizabeth Loftus in which she explained that “a false
memory is a false belief accompanied by sensory detail.”).
197 Piper, supra note 112, at 230-31.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Lynn, supra note 121, at 541–54.
201 March, supra note 69.
193
194
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due process under the law. President John F. Kennedy, while delivering the 1962 Yale University Commencement Address, poignantly
stated that “[f]or the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—
deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth—persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” 202 The myth that the mind has the ability to suppress, persevere, and furthermore, recover a repressed memory of a
traumatic event may be sympathetic, persistent and persuasive; it is
nonetheless, unrealistic and materially, it is inconsistent with the standard promulgated, by the Supreme Court in Daubert and the rule codified by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

202 President John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address (June 11, 1962).
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm.
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